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The Rev. Dr. Gerald B. Winrod, an evangelist based in Wichita, Kansas, 
viewed himself and his followers as defenders. He came to call his media and ministry 
organization the Defenders of the Faith and its flagship magazine, The Defender. From 
Winrod’s view, the Defenders provided a moral bulwark against Darwinists, saloon 
keepers, women who wore revealing clothes, Catholics—sometimes, Jews, and 
especially Communists. At times, Winrod used very thin evidence to apply these labels 
to those he viewed as threats to American morality. For example, Winrod widely 
promoted his assertion that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was both a Jew and 
a Communist.1 
As Richard Polenberg explained in War and Society, the Roosevelt White 
House was sensitive to the civil rights abuses that occurred during World War I and 
endeavored not to repeat them during World War II. Even so, wartime pressures and 
poor judgment led to such spectacular abridgments of rights as the forced internment 
of Japanese residents, Japanese Americans, and Aleutian natives during the war.2 
Though not on the same level, the Roosevelt administration’s Department of Justice 
also erred in initiating the farce that became known as the Great Sedition Trial, in 
which thirty radicals of various degrees of influence, notoriety, and sanity were tried 
collectively. Acknowledging that the trial was an infringement on their rights does not 
mean that the defendants were a sympathetic lot. In particular, Winrod was an 
outspoken anti-Semite given to promoting the long-discredited Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion in blaming Jews for many of the world’s ills. The affair ended in a mistrial when 
the judge died unexpectedly—perhaps sparing the Department of Justice further 
embarrassment. 
Contemporaneous commentators and today’s historians, right- and left-
leaning, agree that the Great Sedition Trial was a poor idea that devolved into a 
courtroom circus. Such a neat conclusion, however, bears reexamination. Perhaps 
there were defensible strategic or political purposes for conducting the trial and 
including Winrod in it. There may have been members of the Roosevelt 
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administration driven to act by their own moral outrage against anti-Semites. Possibly 
Roosevelt himself wished retribution against some of his harsh critics. It is plausible 
that any number of individuals or companies might derive satisfaction in seeing 
isolationists squirm in a courtroom; Winrod certainly earned the scorn of many over 
the years. 
Ultimately, however, the historical evidence still leads to the conclusion that 
there was no justification for the Great Sedition Trial and that Winrod, however 
deplorable his views, neither attempted nor accomplished the anti-American activities 
of which he was accused. The trial could never have succeeded because the 
defendants were not especially influential, because their claims were indistinguishable 
from other prominent isolationists and critics, and because the prosecutor set himself 
an impossible task in trying to argue for conviction under the vague Smith Act. 
Formally known as the Alien Registration Act of 1940, the Smith Act made it a crime 
to advocate for the overthrow of the government, which meant the prosecutor needed 
to both prove seditious statements were made and that they rose to the threshold of 
pushing for the overthrow of government. Despite an extensive investigation into his 
activities and writings, there was no evidence of sedition in the FBI files on Winrod, 
and his anti-Semitism reflected common views of his followers, not to mention other 
Kansans. In some ways, putting Winrod on trial bolstered his perpetual claims of 
persecution, fueling another decade of his hate-filled radical right-wing preaching and 
influencing a movement that continues to the present. 
Winrod, born in 1900, and his Defenders began as a Kansas manifestation of 
the fundamentalist Christian movement of the 1920s and 1930s.3 Winrod’s call to 
ministry was uniquely Kansan. According to family legend, Winrod’s barkeep father 
was on duty at Wichita’s Old Four Ten saloon when Carry Nation smashed the place 
up on one of her temperance raids in Wichita. That event started a change of heart 
for the family, which was completed a few years later when Winrod’s dying mother 
experienced a miraculous healing. His overcome father entered the ministry. Winrod 
delivered his first sermon in his teens, and he joined the Chautauqua circuit at age 
twenty-one. He only briefly had his own church, instead traveling for months at a 
time speaking as a guest in other pulpits or broadcasting in a vehicle outfitted with 
speakers. For the most part, Winrod built his career on appearances in small towns 
and through radio addresses. He maintained a lifelong connection to Midwestern 
agricultural communities even when traveling nationally and internationally. He took 
one step into the political arena himself and attempted to parlay the credibility he had 
gained through his ministry and manner into the Republican nomination for United 
States Senate in 1938. He did not win. Throughout his career, Winrod provided a 
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steady public commentary on current affairs, certain he was seeing world events that 
had been predicted in the New Testament.4 
Winrod was one of thirty people named as defendants in United States vs. Joseph 
E. McWilliams, et al., what became known in the press as the Great Sedition Trial. The 
defendants, their organizations, and their publications were mostly of the far-right 
perspective, opposing United States entry into World War II, blaming Jews and 
Communists for world crises, and promoting an “America First” message. Previous 
indictments of multiple defendants, both called United States vs. Winrod, had been 
returned on July 21, 1942, and January 4, 1943. Neither resulted in a trial. (Winrod 
viewed the fact that his name was not part of the final case title as a sign that the 
Department of Justice feared his ability to muster his Defenders.) O. John Rogge took 
over as federal prosecutor in the matter, seeking a third indictment, which was 
returned on January 4, 1944. Rogge charged Winrod and the others under the Alien 
Registration Act of 1940. The relevant terms of the Smith Act prohibited “advocacy 
of insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces 
of the United States” and “advocacy of the overthrow or destruction of any 
government in the United States by force or violence.” 
The Great Sedition Trial began April 17, 1944, in Washington, D.C. 
Preliminary matters and jury selection took more than a month.5 A New York Times 
article about the selection process showed that the defendants were not going to 
follow protocol. One, James Smythe, pointed at the judge and shouted. Another, Lois 
de Lafayette Washburn, “arose and bowed and then bowed some more.”6 A few days 
later, Smythe again interrupted, “shouting for his attorney on a matter ‘so vital it will 
rock the nation.’”7 In a related hearing, two attorneys tried to subpoena Henry Ford. 
On May 31, the Times described “a day-long barrage of arguments and objections 
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from attorneys.”8 Another newspaper columnist quipped after the first six weeks that 
the trial would last “a minimum of eight years, give or take a fortnight. I base this on 
a number of factors, one of which is that it took twenty-seven and a half minutes, by 
actual clocking, for one of the defense lawyers to interpose a single question.” On 
June 26, “apparently seeking to speed up procedure in the dragging trial,” the judge 
quieted several defense attorneys for being repetitious or speaking out of turn. A day 
later, the judge fined an attorney $200 for engaging in cross-examination in a way that 
deliberately slowed progress. “It was the second fine for Mr. [Henry] Klein for 
contempt of court and the sixth imposed on defense counsel or their clients since the 
trial began eleven weeks ago.”9 
The trial went on for more than seven months before Judge Edward C. 
Eichner died. A mistrial was declared, and the trial ended November 30, 1944; charges 
were formally dismissed a week later. Some post-trial posturing continued, including 
Rogge’s request for additional time to research connections between the defendants’ 
activities and German operations. As Winrod put it, “the chief prosecutor is now in 
Germany, trying, so he says, to find something on which to base a case.”10 No further 
indictments were returned. On June 30, 1947, E. Hilton Jackson, one of Winrod’s 
attorneys, sent him notice that the Court of Appeals had upheld the case dismissal: 
“The opinion of the court, together with the stupid dissent of Justice Edgerton, is 
enclosed.”11  
Given the effort expended by the Department of Justice on the Great 
Sedition Trial, it is worth considering whether there was a strategic argument for 
conducting the trial. Roosevelt himself was predisposed to take the idea of secret plots 
with military objectives seriously, in part because of his service during World War I 
as assistant secretary of the Navy. He remembered well the sabotage of an 
ammunition depot in New York Harbor in 1916, when “thousands of heavy plate-
glass windows fell out of skyscrapers and office buildings in Manhattan and 
Brooklyn.” The next year a shell assembly plant in New Jersey suffered an explosion. 
An investigation showed the German secret service planned these assaults; it is 
reasonable that Roosevelt would have expected similar efforts in the 1940s.12 
In fact, Germany was sponsoring efforts at sabotage and spying. The Federal 
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Bureau of Investigation intervened against Nazi espionage rings in 1938 and 1941. A 
German who lived in the United States for eleven years and claimed to be an early 
proponent of Adolf Hitler tried to sail back home on a small yacht in 1939; he was 
picked up by the United States Coast Guard. In 1940, he made a more conventional 
trip home to Germany and became a leader in a Nazi-sponsored sabotage effort. 
Hitler was demanding that his chief of military intelligence, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, 
do something to slow the American industrial advantage. At the same time, Lt. Walter 
Kappe of the German Abwehr was hatching a plan to engage members of the 
German-American Bund, a Nazi Party offshoot in the United States. The Abwehr 
was an intelligence-gathering agency that collected field reports from agents and other 
sources. Kappe had previously served as the Bund’s propaganda chief, and he believed 
that Bundists could assist clandestine Nazi efforts. As a result, the Nazis recruited and 
trained two teams of saboteurs who had previously lived in the United States and sent 
them by submarine in 1942. 
Viewed from the perspective of a country that had recently been attacked on 
its own soil, the sabotage effort was sinister and unsettling. The German teams had 
explosives, fuses, detonators, and timers, including delay timers disguised as fountain 
pens. The teams also had names of sympathetic Americans whom they expected to 
support their work when greeted with the code word “Pastorius.” When the erstwhile 
saboteurs were arrested, Roosevelt was specifically alerted to the case. He saw it as an 
opportunity to make an example of some subversives—and embarrass the Nazis. 
“Surely they are just as guilty as it is possible to be and it seems to be the death penalty 
is almost obligatory,” he wrote to the attorney general. On another occasion 
Roosevelt asked his assistant, “Should they be shot or hanged?”13 
With the onset of war came a broad acceptance of secrecy and a generalized 
concern for unpatriotic or subversive behavior. The government kept the details of 
the Pastorius tribunal under close wraps, feeding reporters unimportant details about 
the defendants. Opinion polls showed that most Americans found this appropriate. 
The FBI routinely received letters from concerned citizens, as the files on Winrod 
demonstrate. Overseas military personnel routinely had their personal 
correspondence censored. Annoyed that he could not disclose his location in 
Northern Ireland, despite its lack of strategic importance, one soldier wrote to his 
wife: “We must not write with lines apart / Of where we are, from where depart / 
The track along which we have been / The town or port which we are in.”14 
In this atmosphere, the Department of Justice may have sincerely perceived 
a security threat from Winrod and his co-defendants. Director J. Edgar Hoover 
alerted the chief of the Special Defense Unit in 1941 that Winrod should “be 
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considered for custodial detention in the event of a national emergency.”15 Rogge 
claimed that George Deatherage of the American Nationalist Confederation wanted 
all the American Nazi groups to band together as early as 1937. Based on FBI 
investigations and reviews of documents, Rogge said Winrod’s “closest connections” 
included defendants Deatherage, Robert Edward Edmondson, James True, Elizabeth 
Dilling, and Eugene Nelson Sanctuary. Not on Rogge’s list was Elmer J. Garner, 
another Wichitan, who died in the third week of the trial. Certainly some of the 
defendants corresponded, and a few of them met in person. Their most common way 
of interacting was quoting or reprinting articles from one another in assorted 
newsletters and publications published by their various organizations. For example, 
Winrod published articles by True, Sanctuary, and Dilling. Winrod and Garner 
crossed paths from time to time, as when Garner’s publication Publicity endorsed 
Winrod’s bid for Senate in 1938, and when a Publicity columnist in 1940 praised 
Winrod as a great American.16 Trial testimony claimed that the German-American 
Bund’s national headquarters received and distributed articles by at least nine of the 
defendants, including Winrod.17 Regular connections among thirty outspoken critics 
of the government could have looked like military conspiracy to the Department of 
Justice.  
In addition to possible conspiracy, it is conceivable that the Roosevelt 
administration saw a security and public relations threat in the potential the 
defendants had for spreading Nazi propaganda. The indictment claimed that in order 
to destroy democracy throughout the world, “the said Nazi party and its leaders 
carried on a systematic campaign of propaganda.” The propaganda was real; what was 
in question was whether the defendants were deliberately creating or distributing it. 
From the publication of Mein Kampf forward, Hitler was clear about his purposes and 
methods for propaganda. “Every possible organization, agency, individual, and device 
was to be used for propaganda purposes” in order “to enable the Nazis to conquer 
the earth.” Postwar investigation showed that there was a Nazi International effort 
modeled on the Communist International organization. The Soviet Comintern, as it 
was known, engaged in generating propaganda directed to specific groups of people 
identifying how Communism was an answer to their troubles. It also created and 
supported front organizations throughout the 1920s and 1930s. “The Comintern built 
an astonishing media empire to promote the cause of Communism around the globe. 
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… [It] ran dozens, possibly hundreds, of newspapers, publishing houses, film 
production companies, and charities. Officially, most of these organizations claimed 
to be involved in ‘workers’ aid,’ but in reality they were all sponsored by the 
Comintern.” It was a global effort, and it included the United States among its 
targets.18 
The Foreign Affairs Office of the Nazi Party, the Propaganda Ministry, and 
the German Foreign Office all contributed to this Comintern-inspired effort. In 1932, 
the Foreign Section of the Nazi party sent one of its own, Heinz Spanknoebl, to 
Detroit as head of an American branch. Propaganda Minister Paul Joseph Goebbels 
called him home the next year, not because he wished to stop influencing Americans, 
but because Spanknoebl had exceeded his authority. Employing another approach, 
Goebbels authorized $50,000 to support Deutsche Zeitung (German News) to be 
published in the United States. Another Nazi propaganda strategy was mailing 
literature to Americans; defendant George Sylvester Viereck provided names and 
addresses for the effort.19 Winrod received World Service, a regular periodical that was 
part of the Nazi propaganda effort; in 1937, he praised it as “a reliable source of 
European information,” and from 1936 to 1940 World Service referenced Winrod or 
his publications at least six times. In 1939, the Wichita postmaster told an FBI agent 
Winrod had received an item “in the nature of German propaganda and [it] contains 
Hitler’s photograph.”20 The indictment against the Great Sedition Trial defendants 
listed more than forty publications they had allegedly published or distributed, from 
Mein Kampf and the dangerous-sounding “American Vigilante” Bulletins to Winrod’s 
The Defender and the amusingly named information card “West Africa is Not Iceland—
It’s Anything But a Nice Land!”21 
Perhaps there were figures in the Roosevelt administration who suspected and 
feared a Nazi uprising from Winrod or the other men and women named in United 
States vs. McWilliams. In an evidence hearing on June 19, 1944, Rogge made a startling 
claim: 
 
One of the three defendants repeatedly stated that, when the showdown 
came, a large segment of the Army would revolt. The evidence will show 
that they had two plans: one was that after the Communists took over 
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the Government the defendants would put out the Communists and 
seize the government, while the other plan was to seize the Government 
before the Communists got in. The evidence will show . . . that one of 
the defendants discussed ‘the coming revolution’ with a colonel in our 
armed forces, telling the colonel that the revolution would start in New 
York.22 
 
According to the indictment, some or all of the defendants disseminated messages 
that claimed the United States should adopt a national socialist or fascist government 
and that actions and laws of public officials and Congress are traitorous and 
unconstitutional. In his opening statement, Rogge said the defendants were trying to 
“weaken our entire social structure” in hopes it would collapse, creating the 
opportunity to build a new government based on Hitler’s philosophy. Rogge also 
asserted that the defendants were readying “an underground army of Storm Troopers 
. . . who could take over the Government by a march on Washington,” and he 
suggested that Hitler had hand-picked these thirty men and women to found a new 
American government after a German victory.23 
Based on speeches Winrod delivered starting in 1935, the FBI recognized 
him as anti-Semitic and pro-German: “Winrod defends Hitler and his Nazi 
government in the governing of the German race.”24 Nazi sympathizers were, in turn, 
pro-Winrod. The American Nationalist Convention endorsed his Senate campaign in 
its News Bulletin. Trial testimony against Winrod suggested that he had a larger plan 
that might have been interpreted as sedition. A statement at the trial from an optical 
technician in Los Angeles said that one of the defendants, Hans Diebel, had indicated 
that the Bund was “looking for ‘a strong man to take over the government. . . . I 
remember him naming Gerald Winrod as a possible choice.”25 
A former employee reported Winrod’s intention to use his senatorial 
campaign as a springboard to the presidency. Another former employee was set to 
take the stand when the judge died; it is not clear what he planned to say, but Winrod 
expected him to try showing that he and other defendants “were not Christians at 
all—but rank hypocrites, Nazi agents.” The most troubling claims against Winrod 
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came from his wife, Frances, as she sought police help when leaving him, leading to 
their divorce. A statement from Frances Winrod in the FBI files was completely 
redacted, but a series of newspaper articles detailed some of her concerns. She did not 
wish to live in a household in which children were taught the superiority of Hitler and 
the inferiority of France and England. “A favorite joke was to tell them that England 
was like ‘cream.’ And then he would add ‘whipped cream.’” Her husband kept a 
loaded gun nearby at night and told her he had a hideout in Wyoming where she 
would be protected as the government was toppled. She said he would be a political 
leader after an expected revolution, which he believed was imminent, and she could 
be the First Lady. Finally, she said Winrod and his parents were unduly influenced by 
an unnamed cult leader. In public Winrod often made inflammatory statements, but 
he was described as dignified and chose his words carefully. It is hard to know how 
much the media sensationalized Frances Winrod’s claims, but they suggest that 
Winrod was less careful with his words at home and possibly viewed himself as a ruler 
appointed by God. The government could have viewed this as a threat. 
In addition to any security reasons that may have been at play in the decision 
to proceed with the Great Sedition Trial, it is also relevant to consider possible 
political motives. For one, the Roosevelt administration may have seen the trial as an 
expedient way to quiet isolationists. The political power of isolationists had been 
demonstrated by the inability of either political party to secure Congressional approval 
for membership in the World Court beginning in 1924. In 1935, Roosevelt requested 
the Senate finally allow the United States to join. Just as the vote counting seemed to 
be in the administration’s favor, a campaign led by Fr. Charles Coughlin, an anti-
Semitic priest heard on radios across the nation, and William Randolph Hearst, 
publisher of the county’s largest newspaper chain, swayed enough votes to change the 
outcome. The most famous isolationist in the years before World War II was aviation 
hero Charles Lindbergh, seen by the German Foreign Ministry as a close contact. 
Ironically, the Nazis attempted to keep their high regard for Lindbergh close to the 
vest; he did such a good job of representing their positions that they dared not hinder 
him by creating too public an association with him.  By September 1941, Lindbergh 
was intimating that Roosevelt was colluding with the British and the Jews as he pushed 
the country closer to the war. It might have been too politically risky to go after a 
figure as popular as Lindbergh, but a less-connected group of outspoken isolationists 
could be stopped; the Roosevelt administration may even have viewed the trial as a 
warning to Lindbergh and some of the other influential isolationists.26 
Winrod was a good option for setting an example, if that was the intention. 
He was sometimes on the national stage, and he had a loyal following, but he was 
controversial enough and far enough on the fringe to elicit little mainstream sympathy. 
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To some degree, Winrod’s stance against entering the war reflected a view that war 
itself was horrific and sinful; borrowing a page from the Mennonites (with whom he 
had a strong bond), he “emphasized that this destructiveness was rooted in human 
depravity.” He also made the case that supporting Hitler was the same as opposing 
Communism. As P.H. Richert, a board member of Mennonite-affiliate Bethel College 
put it, “What Winrod emphasizes is that Hitler saved Germany from bolshevism, and 
he gives him credit for it, as we no doubt all do.” More often, though, Winrod 
questioned whether “bloodshed was warranted because New Dealers wished to save 
German Jewry from Nazism,” as Leo Ribuffo explains. Winrod’s isolationist writing 
and speaking was extensive, including seven radio broadcasts in April 1939 from a 
Mexican-based radio station that Winrod often employed. The text of one such 
speech, “Keep America Out of War,” was entered into the Congressional Record by 
Senator Robert Reynolds on June 30, 1939. Winrod’s more direct action included 
printing and distributing thousands of copies of anti-war materials such as “Christians 
and Patriots Keep America Out of War” decals, petitions to Washington, and copies 
of a speech by ultra-isolationist Congressman Jacob Thorkelson. The last item 
Winrod was able to send using Thorkelson’s franking privilege, which meant that 
modest fundraising resulted in mass distribution.27 
Beyond his opposition to United States entry into the war, it is conceivable 
that the Roosevelt administration and/or the Department of Justice viewed Winrod’s 
activism as an opening for Nazi politics that needed to be closed with legal action. 
There was widespread belief, sometimes based on compelling testimony, that Winrod 
was a Nazi sympathizer or even an active Nazi agent. Much of the belief was based 
around a trip Winrod made to Europe, including Germany, in 1934 and 1935.28 The 
Germany trip became the focus of so much media and courtroom attention that 
minute details of it were debated. One detail was the charge that Germany had secretly 
funded the trip and/or paid him during the trip to engage in Nazi propaganda back 
home. “While he was in Germany, he was in touch with World Service and its head, 
Ulrich Fleischhauer. He and Fleischhauer tried to help out five defendants in a case 
in Berne, Switzerland, who were being prosecuted for disseminating copies of the 
forged Protocols.” Winrod’s contact with a rare book dealer and suspected German 
agent named Dr. Otto Volbear could have been an opportunity to exchange money 
and orders. Winrod’s accusers emphasized his precarious financial position at the time 
of the trip as represented by his delay in making installment payments on items in 
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Wichita stores; the items were paid off in full when he returned. Following his trip, 
Winrod gave long accounts of Fleischhauer’s arguments against “International 
Jewry.” An anti-Winrod pamphleteer pointedly asked “Does Dr. Winrod have 
privileged and unique access to facts about Germany so that he can correct the alleged 
libels against Hitler which the great press agencies of the world have been sending out 
as to religious conditions within Germany?” 
A statement collected by the FBI claimed that Winrod regularly traveled to 
Germany and was “in the employ of the German Government or at least his 
organization is subsidized with German Government Funds.” In an article published 
in April 1935, Winrod compared the Hitler of 1920, “then a struggling young 
Austrian,” to Martin Luther.29 Later that year, Winrod quoted Goebbels and anti-
Semitic propagandist Julius Streicher, making the case that Germany was the only 
nation opposing “Jewish Masonic Occultism, Jewish Communism, and the 
international Jewish Money Power.” In 1939, Winrod hosted German Methodist 
Bishop F. H. Otto Melle, known for his conciliatory stance toward National Socialism; 
Winrod went on to publish three of Melle’s translated sermons. Some claimed that 
Winrod was operating his own organization based on Nazi philosophy. Rogge said 
followers called Winrod the “American Streicher,” apparently referring to a German 
newspaper that used the term. The FBI interviewed someone who confirmed 
Winrod’s statements on “the superiority of the Teutonic races” and apparently came 
forward “in the light of information she had received that he might be a Nazi agent.” 
An FBI review of Winrod’s publications concluded that depite Winrod’s professed 
opposition to Nazism, he believed “that all the ills of the country may be attributed 
to what is termed ‘International Jewry.’ . . . The above philosophy of Winrod, which 
is analogous to the philosophy of Hitler in Mein Kampf, clearly accounts for Winrod 
being dubbed ‘the Jayhawk Hitler.’”30 
It is possible that Winrod and the other Great Sedition Trial defendants were 
seen as a security threat or that it was politically expedient to bring the case against 
them. It is also possible that those behind the trial were motivated by their own 
morality; anti-Semitism is vile at any time, much less so at such a sensitive time. Of 
course, Winrod claimed throughout his career that he was not the Jews’ enemy, and 
he had the chutzpah to claim empathy for them. Yet whether he learned it from 
Germans or created it himself, Winrod’s brand of anti-Semitism underscored typical 
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Nazi claims. He said the Nazi approach against radical Jews protected other Jews, that 
Nazis were simply trying to save their country from Jewish radicalism, and that Jewish 
economic motivations were really to blame for the war. The FBI found these themes 
repeatedly in examining Winrod’s activities: “Speeches of subject delivered following 
his return to the United States from Europe in 1935 obtained and transmitted to the 
Bureau and are of an anti-Semitic, pro-German nature.” In some cases, Winrod’s 
statements were merely obnoxious, such as his claim that Jewish control had been 
imposed over the Disabled American Veterans. Other Winrod clams were more in 
line with the Great Sedition Trial charges, as some may have viewed them as 
interfering with the loyalty and morale of the United States military. One claim was 
that the same Jewish conspiracy that had dragged the United States into the first world 
war was again pushing for intervention. This is similar to the perspective of one of 
the Pastorius saboteurs that America had been deceived into entering the war by a 
minority of Jews. It also mirrors the message Gerhardt Ruehle, head of the Radio 
Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry was broadcasting: “‘The 
American entry into the war serves only Jewish interests. . . . The act of bringing the 
United States into armed conflict was the work of the Jewish surroundings of 
Roosevelt. . . . The war was only a Jewish war in which American soldiers had to 
bleed.’”31 Winrod went so far as to blame the instigation of the Nazi movement on 
“Jewish domination of Continental Europe, the British Isles, the Balkans, and 
Russia.” In the same publication he stated,  
 
There would be no war in Europe today but for the economic dictatorship 
built up by a few Jewish families, over a period of years. Now that the power 
of these hidden rulers has been challenged, they prefer to throw civilization 
into a pool of blood, rather than release their grip upon the arteries of 
international finance.32   
 
To many people, such a statement is highly offensive, and it may have been enough 
to spark retributive legal action against Winrod and others. 
While moral considerations might have led to the initiation of the Great 
Sedition Trial, a less noble reason must also be evaluated. Perhaps Roosevelt himself 
had it in for Winrod after receiving years’ worth of personal criticism. Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr., perhaps the president’s most sympathetic biographer, described him 
variously as petty, selfish, puckish, and malicious, with a capacity “for calculation, 
sometimes even for cruelty, in human relations. . . . Nearly everybody was 
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expendable.”33 Part of the indictment against the alleged seditionists referred to 
statements claiming 
 
President Roosevelt is reprehensible, a warmonger, liar, unscrupulous, 
and a pawn of the Jews, Communists, and Plutocrats. . . . President 
Roosevelt is a Jew and is working with International Jewry against the 
interests of the people of the United States. . . . President Roosevelt and 
Congress, through a surreptitious and illegal war program against the 
Axis Powers sold out the United States and forced the Axis Power to 
wage war upon us.34 
 
Winrod made his fair share of such claims; Roosevelt and his Brain Trust were among 
the Wichita evangelist’s favorite targets. Winrod had an unusual ability to weave 
commentary on current events with his approach to Biblical prophecy. “Winrod 
combined standard conservative complaints about FDR with an argument that the 
New Deal represented the latest phase in a conspiracy at least as old as human 
history.”35 Roosevelt’s campaign promise to end Prohibition would have been enough 
to turn Winrod against him. The membership of his Brain Trust inspired more 
ranting; Barnard Baruch to Winrod was “the most powerful Jew in the world,” and 
the legislation prepared by Roosevelt’s men was intended to undermine democracy 
and destroy the practice of Christianity. “Furthermore,” as Barbara Jean Beale writes, 
“the radical measures of the president and the Brain Trust were nothing more than 
an attempt to create a revolution to establish Communism in the United States, the 
evangelist proclaimed.”36 Winrod also claimed that Roosevelt bought the 1936 
election. As the Roosevelt-backed Lend-Lease program was in full effect, Winrod 
shared “startling facts, exclusively for the prayer circle” that he had “come into 
possession of unmistakable proof that a well organized, powerfully financed program 
is under way, TO MAKE THE UNITED STATES A PART OF THE BRITISH 
EMPIRE” complete with a new flag.37 Even after the war and the indictments, 
Winrod wrote about the Roosevelt presidency as a “dictatorship” and claimed the 
administration’s “official policy . . . is to put an end to criticism of the Roosevelt 
Administration by whatever means may be necessary. Be ruthless as the enemy—get 
him on his income tax or the Mann Act. HANG HIM, SHOOT HIM, OR LOCK 
HIM UP IN A CONCENTRATION CAMP.”38 The most widely reprinted Winrod 
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claim came from an article in 1934 and a subsequent genealogical chart published in 
1936 tracing Roosevelt’s ancestry to Dutch Jews. Winrod used this information to 
bolster his claim that Jewish economic interests were influencing “Rosenvelt,” and it 
became an evergreen item in anti-Semitic and Nazi publications for the next decade. 
Of course, from Winrod’s perspective, a Jew was by definition also a Communist. 
Winrod also had plenty to say about Eleanor Roosevelt, who smoked, gave advice 
about alcohol to young women, entertained the idea of mandatory conscription for 
young men and women, and spoke at “Negro gatherings.”39 Franklin Roosevelt even 
became a contentious topic during the sedition trial. A radio address in which the 
president referred to “Silver Shirts and others on the lunatic fringe” caused attorneys 
to ask for a mistrial on the grounds that the statement prejudiced the jury. Winrod’s 
attorney, E. Hilton Jackson, spoke up on the matter with his usual loquacity: “There 
has never been a castigation of a defendant in a criminal case that can compare with 
this excoriation.”40 
While none had the power of Roosevelt, any number of patriots, liberals, 
Jews, or media professionals could have wanted Winrod and the other defendants to 
be punished or silenced. They could have pulled strings in Washington or appealed 
to Roosevelt. As one analysis suggests, “The case was authorized by Attorney General 
Francis Biddle because of intense pressure from President Roosevelt, who was in turn 
responding to pressure from some liberals and leftists who demanded action against 
‘fascists’ in America.”41 
In particular, Winrod was obsessed with Walter Winchell, a nationally 
syndicated columnist and radio personality (or as Winrod described him, “the 
collector and distributor of alley, back-door, and bed-chamber gossip”42) and the 
Levand family, publishers of the Wichita Beacon. Winrod often referred to the trial as 
the “Winchell persecution trial,” and in innumerable articles he recounted how 
Winchell was a catalyst for the trial, how Winchell specifically targeted Winrod, and 
how through the prayers of Winrod’s supporters, Winchell’s plans were thwarted. It 
must be said that Winchell made the trial a regular theme of his commentary, and 
according to a defendant and an attorney involved, after the mistrial Winchell began 
“appealing to his listeners to deluge Washington with demands for a new trial.”43 The 
feud between Winrod and the Levands began long before the sedition case and 
continued after it was over. While the Beacon coverage of Winrod more or less kept to 
the facts—though presented with an understandable bias against Winrod—his 
commentary on the Levands freely mixed fact and ravings. In one example that 
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captured the attention of the FBI, Winrod stated “The Wichita Daily Beacon is owned 
and edited by Jews” and took issue with a Beacon editorial stating that the capture of 
Hitler ought to be worth a very substantial monetary reward. Winrod called the 
opinion “a fair example of the Jewish attitude, which is responsible for creating 
nothing short of a war psychosis against Germany in some circles.”44 
Beyond these named Winrod opponents, possibly there was some truth to a 
common assertion among the defendants that secret, powerful Jews were behind the 
whole trial. One defendant said that even among leftists and Jews, the desire for the 
trial lived within an “intolerant minority of leadership.”45 Winrod called these 
unnamed interests “hidden masters in the background who pulled the puppet 
strings.”46 He also asserted that the indictment against him “is obviously the product 
of Jewish motivation” and “purely a matter of POLITICAL PERSECUTION.”47 As 
the old joke goes, just because you are paranoid does not mean they are not out to 
get you; it is within the realm of possibility that Winrod was the victim of a conspiracy.  
The Roosevelt administration, its Department of Justice, or its liberal allies 
may have viewed Winrod and the other alleged seditionists as a strategic or security 
threat, as a political movement that needed to be quelled, or as simply personally 
offensive enough to merit a legal response. Any or all of these reasons could explain 
why the original indictment was pursued. None of these reasons, however, merits the 
actual charges brought against the defendants or the line of argument pursued by 
Rogge. They may have been a collection of Roosevelt-hating, isolationist, anti-Semitic, 
Nazi sympathizing, right wingers, as Winrod certainly was. But they were not 
conspiring together, and their inflammatory messages were not interfering with or 
assaulting the loyalty of the military forces, much less causing insubordination or 
refusal of duty. The defendants were of no particular level of influence. Their 
isolationist and anti-Semitic views, if not mainstream, certainly were shared by many 
Americans, including key public figures. As other Americans did, many of the 
defendants moderated their isolationist stances after Pearl Harbor. The Smith Act 
itself was vague, and the prosecutor had an equally vague approach to the trial. The 
FBI evidence against Winrod was unconvincing, and Winrod had effective 
representation. The trial became a circus, which may have been the most appropriate 
result as it should have never happened in the first place. 
Though all had achieved some level of notoriety, no one in the list of Great 
Sedition Trial defendants was a national figure of importance. “One of the most 
significant features of the Trial was the utter insignificance of the defendants in 
relation to the great importance which the government sought to give to the Trial by 
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all sorts of publicity-seeking devices, one of which was the staging of the Trial in the 
nation’s capital,” where only one of the defendants lived.48 An account of the trial 
sponsored by Winrod emphasized a few notable defendants, including himself, 
William Griffin of the New York Enquirer and “a cultured Christian lady,” Elizabeth 
Dilling.49 (That “cultured Christian lady” would be photographed at the trial giving 
the Nazi salute.) Other defendants, the account acknowledges, were at best known in 
their own regions. An FBI report concerning Winrod and possible espionage may be 
about him or any of the other defendants: “It is not believed that [redacted] exerts 
any great influence on the minds of any number of people.” A similar report about 
Winrod concluded he did not “have any workable organization” beyond his two 
employees and that an interview subject did not believe anyone else working for 
Defenders of the Faith “has any particular importance . . . and she doubts that he has 
any backing except the political backing which he has developed.”50 The FBI never 
found anything about Winrod’s supposed meetings in Germany beyond the reports 
of an informant apparently from the B’Nai B’rith Anti Defamation League. Winrod 
did not have enough sway to be worth the extraordinary efforts of the Department 
of Justice, and it does not seem that any other defendant did either.51 
Furthermore, the stances Winrod and other defendants took in opposing the 
war, blaming the Jews, and castigating Roosevelt were unexceptional. Many other 
public figures, mavericks, and writers took similar positions. In today’s language, there 
was not much difference between the the alt-right Winrod and more conventional 
hardline conservatives. “[O]pponents of President Roosevelt’s pre-Pearl Harbor 
foreign policy and steps in foreign affairs, such as Colonel Lindbergh, Senator Taft, 
Senator Nye or Senator Wheeler, and Colonel McCormick, publisher of the Chicago 
Tribune, would be equally guilty” of violating the Smith Act. Rogge’s book includes a 
photograph of Lindbergh and Wheeler at an America First Committee rally. 
McCormick’s Tribune was typical of isolationist publications; it “had excoriated 
Roosevelt for attempting to involve the United States in yet another European 
conflict. But now that the nation was actually at war, its editorial policy had undergone 
a 180-degree turn.” Political anti-Semitism, “the attempt to establish the corporate 
Jew as a generalized menace, the implication being that some official public remedy 
is called for,” was seen in organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan and national figures 
including Henry Ford and Coughlin. For most people in this era, the height of the 
Klan influence in the 1920s was a recent memory. Thousands of Kansans had been 
members. Winrod and the other Great Sedition Trial defendants did not proclaim 
anything about the impending war, the president, or the Jews that others were not 
																																								 																				
48. St.-George and Dennis, 16. 
49. The Sedition Case, 17. 
50. Andersen memo, December 28, 1939, and Brantley memo, April 10, 1940, in Bradley 
Collection. 
51. Ribuffo, “Gerald B. Winrod,” John Brown to Bob Dole, 235. 
52
also saying.52 
The Smith Act was vague. It required the prosecutor to show the defendants 
were part of a nationwide—perhaps international—conspiracy to influence the 
loyalty, morale, and discipline of United States military forces and/or advocated the 
overthrow of the government. Rogge himself questioned whether the Smith Act 
impeded freedom of speech; in light of his misgivings, he only sought to try 
defendants whom he believed “had some form of Nazi connections.” Even so, Rogge 
thought at the time that any conviction would be overturned by the Supreme Court, 
and later in his career wrote “even a conspiracy to cause a violation of the law, if the 
means to be employed consist of advocacy, should go unpunished.”53 
 
Rogge attempted to establish the existence of coordinated effort, then to tie 
individual defendants to it, 
. . . showing that there was a world-wide Nazi movement which became a 
conspiracy after June 28, 1940, and these defendants became part of it is an 
essential element or really a vital part of showing specific intent … There will 
be further evidence to show that it was in integral part of the Nazi revolution 
to appeal to members of the armed forces to be disloyal to the existing 
democratic republican form of government; it was an integral part.54 
 
Defendants and their attorneys argued that they were a collection of “extreme 
individualists,” and that their purposes for criticizing the government were not the 
same. Rogge could not tie the supposed conspirators to one another, and he largely 
failed to tie them to the Nazis. In a small but telling example, Rogge argued that 
Winrod met Ulrich Fleischhauer in Germany and that Fleischhauer was paid for his 
service; all of this was farfetched but possible. But Rogge never claimed Winrod was 
paid. He may have had an ill-advised friendship before the war, but Winrod was not 
a Nazi agent.55 
Winrod had the benefit of good representation that aggressively represented 
him. His attorneys’ motion for a bill of particulars in a legal proceeding based on a 
vague allegation was appropriate and delivered with style, at one point asking “exactly 
what is meant and intended (to be charged) by this conglomerate, redundant, 
ambiguous, confusing and prolix verbiage” and elsewhere asking how any of Winrod’s 
printed matter “would be distributed to any member of the Military or Naval forces 
of the United States, by this defendant.”56 Winrod praised his legal team, especially 
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Robert Foulston of Wichita, whose “firm has done wonders for the Cause of Christ 
here locally, where persecutors tried to pull the Defender Movement up by the roots.” 
Winrod was also proud of his Washington attorneys, E. Hilton and John Jackson, 
especially when they successfully complained to the judge about Rogge talking outside 
the courtroom to a reporter, earning the prosecutor a reprimand from the bench.57 
Even if he had, like some other Great Sedition Trial defendants, tried the 
tactic of representing himself, there was very little case against Winrod. He engaged 
in many activities that were obnoxious, shocking, or, depending on one’s views, 
unpatriotic. But he did little if anything that could be construed as criminal or 
seditious, especially after Pearl Harbor. Winrod of course disputed the testimony from 
his former employee about Winrod’s future plans, but even if it were true, it did not 
link Winrod to any Nazi network or effort to influence the United States military. 
Myrtle Flowers, Winrod’s business manager and personal assistant, lashed out at the 
employee after all charges were dropped: “The world now knows what you have 
always known in your heart, namely that there was not one word of truth in the things 
you said. You are a professing Christian and as such surely your conscience is causing 
you anguish.” The other employee who did not take the stand said in later years that 
he would have “blown up” the case against Winrod: “It is true that pressure was put 
on me. But I was not going to yield.”58 Nearly all the FBI files on Winrod include 
statements such as “The instant file is not being kept open,” “No further investigation 
will be taken by this office unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau,” or “[Winrod] 
has never made specific statements indicating he was pro-Nazi or un-American.”59 
The Great Sedition Trial failed to muzzle Winrod. If anything, it fueled his 
perpetual stories about the persecution he faced for defending the American people 
against immorality. He wrote his supporters in 1940, “I know something about this 
conspiracy, having suffered at its hands—my steps being constantly dogged for more 
than five years. When I am ready to tell the whole story, of what I have suffered, even 
the Prayer Circle will gasp.” One new angle Winrod used for gaining sympathy as a 
result of the trial was comparing himself to Dr. Martin Niemoeller, the German who 
was targeted by and opposed Nazis. As an advertorial said, “Dr. Niemoeller cried: 
‘GOD IS MY FUHRER!’ Dr. Winrod’s favorite phrase is: ‘WE PREACH CHRIST!’” 
Another story Winrod picked up at the trial and exploited afterward was his claim that 
he had been carrying a pocket-sized Bible in a zippered case at the trial. “On the 
second day, an officer ordered me to put it away . . . and keep it out of sight.” 
Separated from his Bible, the evangelist focused on a small, gold cross he used as a 
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watch fob. “I found myself instinctively fingering with this Cross.” That story leads 
into a dramatic, much-repeated one about the death of Eicher. Depending on the 
account, Winrod either obliquely or explicitly says he prophesied the judge’s demise 
and hints that the power of prayer accomplished the deed. As he said in a radio 
address on March 19, 1945, “Christians all over the Nation were praying. The Judge 
was found dead in bed that night.”60 
Questions raised by the Great Sedition Trial are all too relevant. With the 
United States operating in a constant state of war, what constraints on speech are legal 
and appropriate? How mainstream are the kinds of racist, anti-Semitic, ultranationalist 
views that Winrod and some of his fellow defendants held? What are effective 
strategies for responding to, or even stopping, such sentiments in a world of online 
communication? And would such responses only cause hatemongers to further 
entrench, fed by their own stories of how misunderstood and persecuted they are? 
One lesson from the Great Sedition Trial seems clear. It is fair and necessary 
to punish seditious acts—but not advocacy. Ideas should never be illegal in the United 
States, even if they are shared with others conspiratorially, even if they come from the 
deplorable alt-right. As the trial’s prosecutor stated in his own reflections on the case, 
“Legislatively, the proscription of such a conspiracy is both unwise and ineffective; 
and constitutionally, at least so far as the Congress is concerned, it violates the First 
Amendment.”61 
 
  
Essay on Sources 
A rich array of primary sources is available to a researcher with an interest in 
Gerald B. Winrod in the Wichita State University Library Special Collections and 
University Archives. The Gerald B. Winrod Papers include years’ worth of 
publications by Winrod’s organization and letters he sent to his supporters. The 
papers also feature some personal correspondence and some letters only sent to his 
Kansas mailing list, particularly items asserting that he was the victim of ongoing 
harassment by the publishers of the Wichita Beacon. Especially useful in this paper were 
large scrapbooks of news clippings and letters related to the Great Sedition Trial, 
some including handwritten notes from Winrod or instructions to his longtime 
assistant, M. E. Flowers. 
Linked to the Winrod papers are the John W. Jackson Papers, which come 
from one of the attorneys who represented Winrod. The Jackson Papers include some 
items of evidence from the trial as well as trial transcript excerpts, copies of legal 
documents such as a motion for a bill of particulars, and a copy of the argument 
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Jackson made opposing a continuation of the trial after the judge’s death. Posttrial 
correspondence demonstrates that Jackson had a cordial relationship with other 
defendants and their counsel. There is nothing to suggest whether or not Jackson 
shared Winrod’s world view or politics, but his opposition to the proceedings was 
personal as well as professional; in one letter, he called them a “travesty on justice.” 
Also augmenting the Winrod Papers is the Kenneth Bradley Collection, a 
fascinating set of Federal Bureau of Investigation reports, memos, and letters 
demonstrating that Winrod was repeatedly investigated in the 1930s and 1940s. Most 
reports come with summaries or copies of articles or speeches attributed to Winrod. 
Any researcher interested in the relationship between FBI and subversives in this era 
would be particularly interested in a series of reports from Special Agent Dwight 
Brantley in the Kansas City office. The Bradley papers were crucial to this paper as 
they reveal how small a threat the FBI perceived Winrod to be. 
Two contemporaneous books report on the trial from the perspective of the 
defendants. A Trial on Trial: The Great Sedition Trial of 1944 was published in 1964. Its 
first author is Lawrence Dennis, a defendant who was also apparently a capable 
attorney and represented himself at the trial. It was co-written by Maximilan St.-
George, the attorney who represented Joseph E. McWilliams. The book is obviously 
biased, self-published by an organization calling itself The National Civil Rights 
Committee. Even so, it offers a thoughtful—if often repetitive and pedantic—analysis 
of the trial, including a six-chapter point by point examination of the prosecutor’s 
opening statement. St.-George and Dennis effectively argue that the attempt to prove 
a conspiracy could never have worked. 
Even more biased is The Sedition Case; though not signed, it bears all the 
hallmarks of Winrod’s style and themes. He at least sponsored it and probably wrote 
it. It was published in 1953 by the “Lutheran Research Society,” which also published 
a book about the Koch cancer treatment, a quack cure promoted by Winrod in the 
later days of his career. In contrast to the Bradley Collection, The Sedition Case plays 
up Winrod’s supposed importance as the “arch enemy” of Walter Winchell and 
others. 
Biased toward the government’s case is The Official German Report: Nazi 
Penetration, 1924-1942, Pan-Arabism, 1939-Today(Thomas Yoseloff, 1961) by O. John 
Rogge, the prosecutor of The Great Sedition Trial. The book includes the full text of 
Rogge’s report on Nazi propaganda efforts to influence Americans from September 
1946. Rogge writes convincingly that the Germans were trying to spread their message 
and equally convincingly that the defendants engaged in anti-Semitic and isolationist 
speech; he fails to tie the two truths together. 
An interested researcher will find much more detail on the daily ups and 
downs of the trial itself and the media’s eventual fatigue in the Washington Post, New 
York Times, Chicago Tribune, PM, the Wichita Eagle, and the Wichita Beacon, as well as 
Walter Winchell columns from the time. The National Archives holds records on 
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both the trial and an appeal which were not explored for this project. 
When the Great Sedition Trial is remembered today, it is often by the arch-
conservative and “alt-right” press, held up to support claims that the United States 
government has persecuted such views for decades. Alternately, it is remembered by 
those who understandably perceive Winrod and his philosophical—and, actually, 
biological—offspring as a threat. An example of a clearly leftist but helpful history is 
The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1977, 2nd ed., by Seymour 
Martin Lipset and Earl Raab (University of Chicago, 1970). Liset and Raab mix 
specific examples with context; their definition of political anti-Semitism helped to 
sharpen this paper. 
Less ideological but still critical of Winrod is a master’s thesis from 1994 by 
Barbara Jean Beale, “Gerald Burton Winrod: Defender of Christianity and 
Democracy in the United States.” Beale effectively captures Winrod’s moral activism, 
which was apparently sincere, but she errs in calling Winrod’s participation in the 
Great Sedition Trial his “downfall,” neglecting the influence he rebuilt in the Red 
Scare years after the war. The author’s own “Acts of Courage” is a popular history 
account of Winrod’s senate campaign viewed through the lens of his detractors. It 
can be found in the Kansas Leadership Center’s Journal 3 no. 4 (Winter 2014), 38-47. 
Kansas History has published three relevant articles: “Strident Voices in Kansas 
Between the Wars” by Clifford R. Hope Jr., 2 no. 1 (Spring 1979), 54-64; “Another 
Wichita Seditionist?: Elmer J. Garner and the Radical Right’s Opposition to World 
War II” by Virgil W. Dean, 17 no. 1 (Spring 1994), 50-64;  and “Religion in Kansas” 
by Gary Entz 28 no. 2 (Summer 2005), 120-145. Leo P. Ribuffo in both The Old 
Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right From the Great Depression to the Cold War (Temple 
University, 1983) and his chapter about Winrod in John Brown to Bob Dole: Movers and 
Shakers in Kansas History (University Press of Kansas, 2006) provides a centrist view of 
Winrod and his place in religion and politics. A more recent, beautifully written, 
exploration is by Kansas native and Princeton sociologist Robert Wuthnow: Red State 
Religion: Faith and Politics in America’s Heartland (Princeton University, 2011). 
The Smith Act would again become a matter of public discussion in 1948, 
when the Harry Truman administration charged the leaders of the American 
Communist Party with violating the act. For more on this, see Ellen Schrecker, Many 
Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Princeton University, 1998). 
Saboteurs: The Nazi Raid on America (Knopf, 2004) is a thoroughly researched 
and wildly entertaining account of the Pastorius teams. For more on Nazi propaganda 
and its efficacy in various settings, see Nathaniel Weyl, The Battle Against Disloyalty 
(Crowell, 1951); Arnold A. Offner, American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and 
Germany, 1933-1938 (Belknap Press, 1969); and Werner Rings, Life With the Enemy: 
Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler’s Europe, 1939-1945 (Doubleday, 1982). 
Innumerable books explore Roosevelt’s leadership and demeanor before and during 
the war. Two that were helpful for this paper were Richard Polenberg, War and Society: 
57
The United States, 1941-1945 (J.B. Lippincott, 1972), and Arthur Schlesigner Jr.’s Age 
of Roosevelt series, especially volume one, The Crisis of the Old Order (Houghton 
Mifflin, 1957). 
A useful introduction to Fr. Charles Coughlin, including telling audio clips, comes in 
podcast form. The episode “Father Coughlin” from The Omnibus, hosted by Ken 
Jennings and John Roderick, provides insight into Coughlin’s reach and influence as 
well as his increasingly virulent anti-Semitism. It is found at omnibusproject.com 
(Entry 284.MT2309). 
Major General Orlando Ward: Life of a Leader is a military biography by Russell A. Gugeler 
full of quips and quotes about one soldier’s experience. Historians would do well to 
follow the instructions Ward gave his staff in October 1942 as they were writing for 
both the British and American armies: “Abbreviations have made our common 
language a babble of tongues. . . . God deliver us from having any allies in the next 
war we have.” In addition, Gugeler was my grandfather, so I was damned sure going 
to cite him. 
Online sources include entries from the online civics project “Today in Civil 
Liberties History.”  
  
 
 
  
